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Venture Capital Performance: The Disparity Between Europe and the
United States
Abstract
This paper compares the success of venture capital investments in the United States and in
Europe by analyzing individual venture-backed companies and the value generated within the
stage nancing process. We document that US venture capitalists generate signicantly more
value with their investments than their European counterparts. We nd di¤erences in contracting
behavior, such as staging frequency and syndication, and evidence that they help to explain the
observed performance gap and we report a substantial unexplained residual. We nd that US
venture funds investing in Europe do not perform better their European peers. European Common
Law and Civil Law countries exhibit comparable levels of venture performance, and di¤erences
in stock market development or tax subsidies in favor of venture investments are unrelated to
performance di¤erences. European IPO exits from venture investments yield returns similar to
the US, while trade sale exits weakly underperform. We attribute the overall performance gap
essentially to the segment of poorly performing companies.
Keywords: venture capital performance, nancial development, stage nancing, exit, moni-
toring.
JEL classication: G24; G38.
1. Introduction
Venture capital is an American invention, and the United States is home to the largest venture
capital industry by far. Venture capital has not spread globally as easily as have other nancial
innovations. What are the necessary conditions for a successful imitation of the US model?
Europe, the worlds second most important region in terms of R&D spending, is an interesting
case to consider. While European governments have exhorted the virtues of venture capital, and
designated its development as a key policy priority for more than twenty years, the sector has
remained a laggard until recently. A European venture capital (VC) industry geared towards
innovation and early-stage nancing has really only taken hold in the late 1990s,with investments
reaching 12 billion dollars in 1999, roughly a quarter of the US level.
This paper proposes a direct comparison between the United States and Europe, and seeks
to explore the process by which VC creates economic value on the basis of company-level data.
It contributes to an emerging literature on comparative international studies of venture capital
by focusing on possible obstacles to the emergence of a VC industry in developed countries with
relatively high levels of R&D spending, investor protection, and law enforcement.
Trade associations and VC professionals have long asserted that realized returns of venture
investments in Europe have historically been below required returns, and pointed to this under-
performance as the main obstacle to the development of a strong VC industry. Also, the relative
lack of venture funding in Europe has been frequently attributed to the absence of attractive and
liquid markets for VC exits, in particular for IPOs (e.g., Black and Gilson, 1998). These beliefs
form the starting point for our analysis. We investigate whether a measurable performance gap
between the United States and Europe exists for the late 1990s when the European VC market
was emerging in terms funding levels and exit opportunities. And if so, what explains it? Does
the European case hold more general lessons for venture capital development?
More specically, we investigate the period between 1997 and 2003, starting with the year
that marks the beginning of rapidly increasing venture funding levels in Europe and ending after
European venture investments had peaked. Our focus on this recent period also o¤ers an op-
portunity to address Black and Gilsons hypothesis on the absence of su¢ ciently liquid primary
equity markets, since this period was characterized in Europe by a surge in high-tech IPOs as
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well as the creation of a number of new stock markets geared to high-tech companies markets.
To the best of our knowledge, no comparative analysis of US and European VC performance has
been undertaken previously.
Research Design and Results. Based on data from the Venture Economics database, we mea-
sure the value generated by every portfolio company in our sample by the Internal Rate of Return
(IRR) between the rst nancing round and the last round valuation (prior to exit) of the project.
Round valuation data represent an intriguing data source in VC funding as they report the deal
pricing in every nancing round, i.e. actual transactions between stakeholders with conicting
interests that determine the fraction of equity-linked securities a¤orded to investors in exchange
for their cash. Determining VC success on the basis of round valuations o¤ers a methodological
advantage when compared with the alternative, analyzing performance until exit: performance
measures based on exit valuations will inevitably select only projects that exit with a recorded
market valuation; these investments, however, typically constitute an upwards biased sample.
Moreover, since we are interested in the economic value generated by venture investments rather
than an assessment of the asset class, our method seems well-suited as it allows to compute the
gross valuation e¤ect of venture investments rather than net cash disbursements to limited part-
ners on which asset management studies focus. The focus on round valuations also allows us to
perform new tests for data endogeneity based on lead-lag structures of intermediate valuations.
While our focus on early stage investments clustered in a few industries and a limited time
period partially mitigates the impact of cross-sectional heterogeneity in risk, we explicitly control
for risk, in particular for region-specic and technology-specic risk, but nd results that are
largely invariant with respect to the choice of risk adjustment. Our main results are the following.
 Our data show a gap between the value generated by US venture capital investments and
European investments that is statistically highly signicant and very large in economic
terms. The di¤erence is independent of the choice of performance benchmark.
 We observe several di¤erences in the relationship between VCs and entrepreneurial rms
and in their behavior that indicate a more active role of US VCs and a sophisticated coop-
eration between them. US venture capitalists invest almost twice as much in their portfolio
companies, make a larger portion of funding contingent on the completion of the rst round,
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organize themselves in larger syndicates, tend to involve corporate VC more frequently, and
tend to be more specialized.
 These di¤erences can partially explain the observed di¤erence in value creation. We nd
the positive relationship between the frequency of monitoring and performance that theory
predicts for the US but a negative relationship in Europe. Also, the amount invested in the
rst round as well as the presence of corporate VC (dimensions where the US dominates)
have a signicant positive impact on returns. Much of the performance gap, however,
remains unexplained by such di¤erences.
 US venture funds investing in Europe do not create more value than their European peers.
 Venture investments in European Common Law and European Civil Law countries show a
comparable level of value creation.
 Di¤erences in the tax treatment or the legal environment for venture investments are unre-
lated to the gap in value creation.
 For the subsample of companies with a successful venture exit, we nd no performance
di¤erence for companies exiting through IPOs and only a small di¤erence for companies
exiting via trade sales. We conclude that the di¤erence in the value creation process must
be primarily due to di¤erences in poorly performing investments as we nd.
Overall, our results suggest that the United States appears to have a markedly better devel-
oped market for VC, with Europe still signicantly lagging behind. We test for a wide variety
of possible reasons that the nance literature mentions as possible performance drivers, but nd
that only contracting proxies can explain some of the di¤erence, while causes such as tax treat-
ment, legal systems or stock market development, or the import of experienced VCs, seem to be
unimportant. Other factors that our microlevel study based on VC transactions cannot capture
may be important.1
Related Literature. Our work is related to an emerging literature on international and com-
parative studies. On the whole they report VC contracting practices at variance with the US
1These factors could include, among others, the presence of clusters of innovative activity, research output and
spillovers from research universities and organizations, cultural attitudes towards risk and propensity to entrepre-
neurship.
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role model. Lerner and Schoar (2004) look at emerging markets in Eastern Europe and elsewhere
and nd a strong reliance on straight equity and direct board control. Cumming, Schmidt and
Walz (2008) show that an increase in legality accelerates the rst investment, and facilitates syn-
dication and board representation of venture investors for a sample drawn from North and South
America, Asia and Europe. Similarly, Cumming, Fleming and Schwienbacher (2006) nd evi-
dence for Asia-Pacic in support of the relevance of legal systems for exit choices. Cumming and
Walz (2004) report that variables capturing VC, entrepreneur and investment characteristics can
account for a substantial fraction of cross-sectional return variations in IRRs. Our ndings are
generally consistent with these studies, but we try to explain internal rates of return simultane-
ously by company-specic and country-specic inuences. This puts us in a position to argue that
contracting features and the legal environment alone are unlikely to explain the distance to the
United States. The study most closely related to our main nding is Gottschalg and Phalippou
(2007) who consider fund-level performance measures for private equity funds in the US and in
Europe. They also nd that funds in Europe underperform their US peers.2
The majority of empirical studies on VC in Europe are based on questionnaires. In a cross-
country analysis, Manigart et al. (2002) highlight some determinants of required returns on
VC investments, and Sapienza, Manigart and Vermeir (1996) examine the impact of the VC
governance structure in di¤erent countries. Bottazzi, Da Rin and Hellmann (2008) show that
independent, specialized, experienced and highly educated VCs are more likely to be actively
involved in the management of portfolio companies. Bottazzi, Da Rin and Hellmann (2007)
present questionnaire evidence that across Europe better legal systems (measured by legal origin
or rule of law) are associated with more investor involvement, more downside protection for the
investors, and more corporate governance involvement of VCs. Schwienbacher (2004) analyzes
the determinants of VC exit decisions in a comparison of US and European VC rms and nds
signicant di¤erences, for example on the use of convertibles and syndicate size, conrming and
extending ndings of Bascha and Walz (2001) for Germany. Da Rin, Nicodano and Sembenelli
(2006) study the evolution of aggregate VC investments in fourteen European countries as a
2Unlike our study, Gottschalg and Phalippou (2007) do not observe individual portfolio rms and, therefore,
cannot apply lters that restrict the sample to genuine start-up rms. This is a crucial step of our methodology,
since many venture-backed rms in Europe are not start-ups. However, they consider a longer time horizon and a
larger sample than we do, making it an important complementary piece of evidence on the perfomance gap.
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function of policy measures and nd a signicant impact of the creation of stock markets geared to
entrepreneurial rms and of capital gains taxations. Mayer, Schoors and Yafeh (2005) investigate
the funds raising process in various countries. Schmidt and Wahrenburg (2003) report that
reputational e¤ects of venture capitalists are a major determinant of contractual relations between
European VC funds and their investors. Unlike our paper, these studies do not investigate VC
performance directly.
There has also been a recent literature studying the returns of private equity and VC from
an asset pricing perspective, including Kaplan and Schoar (2005), Gottschalg and Phalippou
(2007), Ljungqvist and Richardson (2004), and Jones and Rhodes-Kropf (2004). On the whole,
this literature shows that private equity returns contain considerable systematic and idiosyncratic
risk and that risk-adjusted net returns do not outperform public equity investments.3 There are
considerable di¤erences between this strand of work and our study. First, these studies focus on
the United States and they mix VC and private equity investments whereas our study is very
careful in selecting only VC investments in start-up companies. Second, since our focus is on
economic value created rather than risk-adjusted investor returns, we look at investments at the
portfolio-company level and we use stage valuations to minimize selection bias. By contrast,
these studies look at returns at the fund level,4 they focus on cash distributions and thus on
exited investments.5 Third, we focus on an international comparative study in which the US and
the European samples are selected according to consistent criteria, whereas those studies have
overwhelmingly US-based samples.
Therefore, from a methodological point of view, our paper is most closely related to two
studies that calculate company-level returns for venture-related investments, namely Cochrane
(2005) and Woodward and Hall (2003). Both studies, however, use samples that exclusively
3Moreover, Kaplan and Schoar (2005) and Gottschalg and Phalippou (2007) show that US funds show signicant
return persistence, and Jones and Rhodes-Kropf (2004) nd evidence that returns are correlated with idiosyncratic
risk. Besides, there is considerable variation in scope and results across those four papers. More precisely, Kaplan
and Schoar (2005) and Jones and Rhodes-Kropf (2004) nd an insignicant average alpha whereas Gottschalg
and Phalippou (2007) report a negative alpha. Ljungqvist and Richardson (2004) do not analyze risk-adjusted
performance explicitly but nd returns that are comparable.
4Kaplan and Schoar (2005), Gottschalg and Phalippou (2007), Ljungqvist and Richardson (2004) and Jones and
Rhodes-Kropf (2004) all undertake fund-level performance analyses.
5Kaplan and Schoar (2005) and Gottschalg and Phalippou (2007) make di¤erent assumptions on non-exited
investments that explain a substantial part of the di¤erence in the aggregated performance estimates between these
two studies.
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contain US companies. Moreover, both studies are interested in understanding the risk-return
trade-o¤, and their focus is on reducing the impact of sample selection bias. They do not explore
performance drivers. Cochrane calculates returns for each nancing round separately and limits
the sample to nal valuations from IPOs and trade sales, whereas we take an integrated approach
that solicits as many observations as possible at each round. Woodward and Hall (2003) include
round valuations just as we do, but they do not systematically research the impact of various
contractual features on VC performance.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical and empirical
background for our study. In Section 3 we describe the data and develop the variables used in our
empirical tests. Section 4 presents the results of our comparative performance study. In Section 5
we investigate whether the performance gap can be attributed to di¤erences in the use and success
of various exit routes. Section 6 discusses issues of robustness, selection bias and endogeneity.
Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2. Theoretical and Empirical Background
Two strands of prior work are relevant for our hypotheses, the mostly theoretical literature on the
contractual relationship between venture nanciers and entrepreneurs, and the mostly empirical
literature that analyzes venture nancing in the wider context of nancial development.
2.1. Venture Capital Contracting
Monitoring, Advising and Relationship Financing. Venture capitalists are usually seen as actively
involved relationship investors, and their monitoring role and the ensuing double agency prob-
lems have been emphasized by Schmidt (2003) and Cornelli and Yosha (2003), Repullo and Suarez
(2004), among others, a view supported in empirical studies (Gompers and Lerner, 1999). More
specically, they are seen as taking on a dual role as advisors and as monitors (e.g. Casamatta,
2003) and as being actively involved in constituting the management team and frequently replac-
ing the founding entrepreneurial team (Hellmann, 1998). Therefore, measures of a more active
involvement of VCs in a project should be associated with more value creation.
We specically investigate the relationship character of the link between VCs and portfolio
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companies. In this respect, we investigate two distinct hypotheses that can be characterized as
the conict between relationship building versus specialization. On the one hand, along the lines
of the nancial intermediation literature (e.g. Rajan, 1992), more continuity of VCs (over the
entire project lifetime) means a closer relationship that reduces asymmetric information hurdles
to nancing. This should increase observed average performance. On the other hand, VCs may
be specialized to accompany either initial stages or stages close to exit; specialization then clearly
may be a source of value creation, as VCs presumably are more expert in the stage-specic skills
of their contribution. Therefore, we will test whether a larger degree of continuity or a longer
duration in the VC company relationship increases or decreases the value creation over the lifetime
of the VC investment cycle in a project.
Based on the seminal contribution by Aghion and Bolton (1992), the literature has emphasized
that contingent control rights, such as the use of contingent securities or contingent voting rights,
play an important role in the VC cycle and value creation process. Schwienbacher (2004) directly
compares the use of contingent control rights in the United States and in Europe, and nds that
they are signicantly more common in the United States than in Europe, consistent with the
predictions of Bottazzi, Da Rin, and Hellmann (2007) and with other empirical evidence.6 There
is no clear evidence, however, that these di¤erences directly explain VC performance. Our data do
not allow us to contribute to this important analysis as we do not observe details on the securities
that are issued in the nancing rounds.
Stage Financing. The theory literature suggests that stage nancing gives a real option to
abandon a project that alleviates agency problems. In Neher (1999), stage nancing can reduce
the bargaining power of entrepreneurs who can repudiate their nancial obligations. Cornelli and
Yosha (2003) analyze the problem of an entrepreneur manipulating short-term results for pur-
poses of window-dressingand show that stage nancing is a means to mitigate this problem.
Berk, Green and Naik (2004) focus on the evolution of the risk prole that changes from being
purely technical risk in early stages and to more diverse sources of risk in later stages and show
that the systematic risk component is strongest in early stages, justifying a larger risk premium.
6Additional evidence on the less frequent use of contingent securities outside the US is documented for example
in Kaplan, Martel and Stromberg (2003), Lerner and Schoar (2005), Cumming (2005) and Bascha an Walz (2001),
when comparing them to US studies. An important alternative hypothesis is proposed by Gilson and Schizer (2002)
who attribute the frequent use of convertibles in the United States to tax considerations.
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Bergemann and Hege (2003) suggest that stage nancing reduces the entrepreneurs information
rent, and allows to increase entrepreneurial e¤ort and alleviate nancial constraints. Cuny and
Talmor (2005) compare traditional round nancing with milestone nancing, where VCs commit
to the nancial terms of multiple funding stages conditional on achieving certain benchmarks.7
All of these papers, and a host of empirical literature (for example Gompers, 1995), suggest
that a higher frequency of milestones and nancing rounds should translate into a more e¤ective
use of the abandonment decision, and hence smaller agency costs and better investment perfor-
mance. Therefore, we will test whether a more frequent use of staging instruments implies higher
performance.
Syndication and Corporate Venture Funding. Besides the obvious motive of risk diversication,
leading motives for VC syndication mentioned in the literature are (i) improved screening by se-
curing a second opinion in the due diligence process (Casamatta and Haritchabalet, 2007; Cestone,
Lerner and White, 2005); (ii) complementarities in the monitoring and advising of companies and
(iii) the sharing of information and pooling of contacts in the exit phase. These reasons imply
that syndication should have a positive impact on measurable performance. Hochberg, Ljungqvist
and Yang (2007) nd indeed evidence that VC rms with better network connections established
through their position in syndicates have signicantly better performance. Therefore, we test
whether measures of value creation are positively correlated with the extent of syndication.
A related question is the relationship in a syndicate between experienced or highly reputed
VCs and comparatively young and small ones. The theory literature is not unanimous in this
respect. Barry et al. (1990) emphasize the certication and reputation gains when syndicating
with more experienced VCs, suggesting that syndicates will combine young with experienced
VCs. On the other hand, Cestone, Lerner and White (2005) argue that agency conicts between
VCs lead to assorted matches of VCs joining forces with other VCs of comparable screening and
monitoring abilities. In our context, since European VC rms tend to be considerably younger,
we investigate the di¤erence between homegrown European VC rms and US venture capitalists
operating in Europe as an important measure for such di¤erences in experience.
7Cuny and Talmor (2005) show that the milestone nancing dominates round nancing when venture capitalists
e¤ort is relatively small, the funding volume decreases (relatively) over time or if there is heteregeneity in beliefs
between nanciers and entrepreneurs. Their predictions are di¢ cult to test, however, as most venture capital
arrangements combine milestones and round nancing and milestones are only imcompletely observed.
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Moreover, syndication facilitates the inclusion of corporate investors that can act as a com-
mitment device to avoid hold-up problems and help secure distribution channels or a potentially
important customer pool, see e.g. Hellmann (2002) and Riyanto and Schwienbacher (2006). The
corporate venture fund can also provide additional complementary skills to the syndicate as well
as important resources from the corporation that backs it. Therefore, we also explore the value
impact of the presence of corporate VC in the investor pool.8
2.2. Financing of Innovation, Financial Development and Tax Incentives
Based on previous literature that analyzes conditions for VC and the nancing of innovation in a
wider context, we explore the following aspects.
IPO Exits. Black and Gilson (1998) identify the lack of IPO markets for VC exits as the
main reason why venture nancing lags behind in countries such as Germany or Japan. Portfolio
companies where venture investors exit through IPOs are generally associated with higher returns
(see Gompers, 1995, for the US and Schwienbacher, 2004, for Europe). While historically Europe
o¤ered little opportunity for high-tech rms to go public, the creation of technology-oriented stock
markets in all of Europes main countries in the late 1990s9 has created a more even eld between
the US and Europe, at least for the period of time where these new markets o¤ered a fairly
liquid alternative for VC exits.10 Therefore, we would expect a relatively equal VC performance
in Europe and the US for ventures that exited during the liquid IPO market in Europe, i.e.
1998-2000.
Stock Market Development. Rajan and Zingales (2003) and Black and Gilson (1998) identify
the importance of market-based nancing, and in particular the role of stock exchanges, as a key
determinant for successful venture development. This hypothesis suggests that we should nd
a higher intensity and also higher returns of VC funding in countries with a high stock market
capitalization/GDP ratio, the most widely used metric of stock market development. Since Europe
8Other rationales for venture capital syndication are provided by Admati and Peiderer (1994) and Lakonishok,
Shleifer and Vishny (1991).
9The German Neuer Markt, the French Nouveau Marché, London-based Techmark and Brussels-based Easdaq
are the best-known examples, which all broadly used the Nasdaq as their role model.
10 In the wake of the collapse of the internet boom, a number of these markets have ceased to exist or been merged
with the main stock markets (Easdaq and the Neuer Markt for example), whereas others continue to exist but had
very little IPO activity between 2001 and 2004.
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contains both countries with a higher ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP than the US
(UK, Netherlands, Switzerland) as well as countries with a lower ratio (most countries on the
continent), there is su¢ cient variation in the data to make this a rich test.
Law and Finance. Following the seminal work by La Porta et al. (1997, 1998), legal origin
has been explored as an explanatory variable in many studies of nancial performance. The
quality of law enforcement has also been emphasized as a determinant. Given that contracting
problems are pervasive in the nancing of innovation, VC should be particularly a¤ected by these
concerns. Lerner and Schoar (2004) nd evidence, in a sample of private equity investment in
emerging markets, that both legal origin and an index of law enforcement (time-to-decision) seem
to matter for the contractual relationships between venture investors and portfolio companies.
Cumming, Schmidt and Walz (2008) show that higher standards of legality translate into more
control rights for VCs. In a theoretical model that specically addresses VC, Bottazzi, Da Rin,
and Hellmann (2007) derive comparative statics results that predict that, in a better legal system,
investors provide more value-adding support, demand more contractual downsideprotection, and
are more active in exercising corporate governance rights. All these results suggest that a higher
degree of legal investor protection translates into better venture performance.
Tax Subsidies for Venture Capital and Related Fiscal and Legal Conditions. Many European
governments o¤er tax subsidies or similar incentives for VC investors (like capital guarantees in
Germany and Austria), or incentives for venture-backed entrepreneurs like a generous capital gains
taxation. Such public subsidies may be a source of underperformance if they distort investment
decisions and make VCs inclined to fund projects that they would otherwise reject (see Lerner,
1999). We hypothesize, therefore, that measures of scal subsidies and related supports to venture
funding may be negatively related with performance.
3. Data
Our data set is constructed from the database of Venture Economics, a division of Thomson
Financial. Venture Economics o¤ers the best available database for performance-related data on
European VC markets, even though the reporting is substantially less complete than on the US
side. For Europe, we extract from this database all portfolio companies for the 15 countries that
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were member of the European Union during the period of our study (EU-15). Since the paper
focuses on venture capital, we limit the search to all companies that are reported as venture
capital-related in the database (i.e. we exclude notably buyout- and restructuring-related
transactions). We then require that Venture Economics report at least one valuation observation
for a portfolio company, i.e. the estimated total value of the company rm at one or more nancing
stages. Firm valuations are the reported values on which the contracts and share allocations at the
beginning of each new nancing round are based. We obtain a sample of 394 companies. Among
them are 188 from the United Kingdom, 65 from France, 51 from Germany, 25 from Ireland, 16
from Italy, 12 from Sweden, 11 from the Netherlands, 11 from Belgium, 7 from Spain, 5 from
Denmark and 3 from Austria.
To correct for possible misclassications of rms in the Venture Economicss venture capital-
related database, we remove from the sample all companies that have neither a single round that
was dened as seedor early stagein the database nor at most three years of age at the time
of their rst nancing round. Our objective is to avoid comparing di¤erent types of investment
on both sides of the Atlantic. Therefore, we also apply a lter restricting the sample to companies
with a rst nancing round not earlier than January 1997, and drop a couple of outliers based on
pre-nancing size or age, leaving us with 274 observations.
Our focus on early stage investments that are clustered in a few industries and that span a
short time window of seven years largely reduces the role of any important heterogeneity in project
risk. Nevertheless we include explicit controls for risk. First, we choose a risk adjustment that
specically addresses regional di¤erences in risk between the US and Europe by calculating excess
returns relative to the MSCI index in each region. Second, we choose the NASDAQ index as an
alternative risk adjustment that controls for the asset class of high-tech companies. In the absence
of any comparable high-tech stock market index for Europe, we cannot control for both sources
of risk simultaneously. We nd that our results are virtually identical under both risk adjustment
procedures, leading us to conclude that the specic choice of risk adjustment is irrelevant for the
results that we report. A third possible risk adjustment, namely industry-specic risk, seems
impracticable for our sample given that it is dominated by very few industries. Therefore, we
only control for rms that are either internet specic or in Communication and Media.
We also need to exclude companies for which a performance measure could not be calculated
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for lack of data. These are companies for which we had only a single valuation observation and
where this valuation concerned the rst nancing stage. These companies were dropped from the
sample. Our nal sample contains 146 European companies, 71 of them being from the United
Kingdom and 75 from Continental Europe or Ireland.
For the United States, we construct a random sample of comparable size. We apply the
same ltering criteria as for European companies, limiting the sample to venture-related portfolio
companies for which there is at least one valuation entry recorded (close to 6000 as of June 2003),
that have at least one nancing round that is characterized as seedor early stage, and where
the rst nancing round took place in or after January 1997. We then randomly select a sample
of 233 companies that satisfy the criterion that at least two valuations are reported, of which one
in the initial round.
Additional data sources complementing our data include the tax and legal index developed
by the European Venture Capital Association (EVCA, 2003)11; World Bank data for 1997 for
country measures of stock market capitalization; and nally Dealogic, Lexis-Nexis, Factiva and
national stock exchanges as sources on exits and exit valuations.
3.1. Description of Variables
For all the companies in our sample, we extract the following information from the Venture
Economics database: the age of the rm at the moment of the rst nancing stage, the activity
of the rm, and for each nancing stage, the date at which it took place, the type of the investors
(public, corporate or nancial), the amount they have invested and the post-money valuation of
the rm. From this information, we dene variables that can be grouped as follows:
Portfolio company characteristics. We capture company age by dening a variable AGE as
the time lapsed between its founding date and the date of its rst nancing round. For industry
a¢ liation, we group companies in seven industry groups.12 Information about the industry in
which the company operates is captured by the dummy TMT which is equal to 1 if the activity
11The EVCA index attributes a score to European countries since 2003 (the rst year where it is available) based
on their tax subsidies for venture funding, corporate and personal income tax rates and capital gains taxation, as
well as related legal conditions.
12The seven industries are aggregated by following Venture Economics industry classication (VEIC) system.
Our seven industries are (1) internet (2) communication and media (3) computer software (4) computer hardware
and semiconductors (5) manufacturing and other services (6) medical and health care and (7) biotechnology.
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of the rm is either internet specic or Communication and Media, and 0 otherwise.
Lifetime variables. First, we dene the total duration between the rst and the last stage
(TOTALDURATION) and the number of stages (TOTALSTAGES). The ratio between these two
variables gives a measure the frequency of nancing rounds (AVG DURATION). We frequently
use the notation N for the value of TOTALSTAGES. Second, we dene the variable AVG CONTI
which represents the average continuity of investors. AVG CONTI is constructed as follows. For
each stage n  2, we compute the number of times that VC s participating in stage n participated
in previous stages. This number is then divided by (n 1) times the number of VC s participating
in stage n. We obtain CONTI(n), and we can then dene AVG CONTI as
hPN
n=2CONTI(n)
i
=N ,
which is a measure of the average fraction of continuing VCs in each of the N nancing rounds.
Third, we dene the variable AVG SYNDICATE SIZE which represents the average number of
funds invested in each stage. It is constructed as follows. For each stage n, we compute the number
of VC s who participate in stage n (SYNDICATE SIZE (n)). Then, AVG SYNDICATE SIZE is
dened as
hPN
n=1 SYNDICATE SIZE(n)
i
=N . Fourth, we dene the variable AVG AMOUNT
which represents the average amount invested in each nancing round. For each stage n, we
compute the total amount invested in stage n (AMOUNT (n)). Then, AVG AMOUNT is dened
as
hPN
n=1AMOUNT(n)
i
=N . Finally, we dene the variable CORP INVESTOR which is a dummy
equal to one if there is a corporate investor, and 0 otherwise.
First stage variables. We use three initial stage characteristics: the amount invested in the
rst stage normalized by the average amount invested per round (AMOUNT STAGE 1), the
number of investing funds in the rst stage (SYNDICATE SIZE STAGE 1), and the duration
of the rst nancing round (DURATION STAGE 1). We also use a measure of continuity of
investment between the rst two rounds (EARLY CONTI), which is a dummy equal to 1 at least
one fund invested in both stages 1 and 2, and 0, otherwise.
Market conditions. We want to take into account market conditions, and more precisely the
so-called internet bubbleon valuations and returns. To do so, we dene two dummy variables:
BUBBLE START and BUBBLE END. The former one is equal to 1 if the rst stage took place
between September 1998 and March 2000 and 0 otherwise, and the latter dummy is equal to 1
if the nal valuation took place between September 1998 and September 2000 and 0 otherwise.13
13September 1998 marks the end of Russian crisis, the last market downturn prior to the internet bull market,
13
We nd similar results when using year dummies (omitted from the tables). In the analysis we
further use the variable COMMON LAW that equal to 1 if the portfolio company is located in a
Common Law country, and 0 otherwise. We also include the dummy variable EU DUMMY that
is equal to one for European companies and zero for US investments.
3.2. Summary Statistics
We report summary statistics of the explanatory variables in Table 1. Test of di¤erences in means
between Europe and the United States are presented in Table 2.
Many sample characteristics are broadly comparable with earlier studies, and show no remark-
able di¤erences between the two samples. Projects go through 3.32 nancing rounds on average
and remain in a venture nancing relation (until the last reported round) for a little less than two
years. Roughly, half of the companies are in technology, media or telecommunications (TMT) and
obtain their rst nancing within the September 1998-March 2000 period that we characterize as
bubble. Almost a quarter of the US sample also exits in that period, four times more than in
Europe. The rst nancing round amounts to 18.7% of rm value in Europe and 15.6% in the
US. The median rm is one year old when receiving its rst nancing, and only 3% of companies
are older than 7 years. European rms appear to be slightly older (2.45 v. 1.96 years in means
and 1.27 v. 1.06 years in medians), but these di¤erences are not signicant.
We observe, however, highly signicant di¤erences along four dimensions. First, the total
amount invested per project and the average amount invested per nancing round are about 50%
larger in the United States than in Europe (signicant at the 0:1% level). Interestingly, there is
no di¤erence in the initial nancing round.
Second, European VCs exhibit a signicantly larger continuity, in the sense that European
VCs are more likely to participate in follow-up rounds, perhaps due to more severe informational
problems. In contrast, US VCs are less likely to participate in follow-up rounds, leaving a larger
role to new investors with possibly additional skills. When measured by AVG CONTI, the average
fraction of continuing VCs, the continuity is signicantly larger in Europe at the 1% level. The
same is true, albeit statistically weaker, for the measure of continuity between the rst and the
whereas September 2000 coincides with the peak levels of the NASDAQ index. Our results are robust to an
alternative specication of the bubble period, or the inclusion of year dummies.
14
second round, EARLY CONTI.
Third, the average VC syndicate, over all rounds, includes 3.7 members in the United States
but only 2.8 in Europe. This is a highly signicant di¤erence (at the 0:1% level). There is again
no signicant di¤erence in the initial nancing round. This observation seems consistent with
the idea that VC networks in the US operate more e¢ ciently and that US VCs have better tools
to enforce cooperative behavior in syndicates than their European counterparts. It would also
appear consistent with the notion that in a more mature VC market, VCs are more specialized,
so that the observation of larger syndicates and less continuity might indeed be connected. Both
observations suggest that US VCs can implement a more e¢ cient division of labor among them
than Europeans.
Finally, 36% of VC-backed companies in the United States include a corporate investor in
the syndicate at least one nancing round, which is twice as many as in Europe (signicant at
the 0:1% level). This lends support to the idea that US VCs are more successful in integrating
complementary industry expertise into the venture funding cycle.
These ndings show that the contract characteristics of projects are di¤erent in the United
States and in Europe, and di¤erences concerning measures of the relationships among VCs and
of the relationships between VCs and companies are the largest. Overall, the observed di¤erences
appear to document an edge of US venture capital rms over their European counterparts.
4. Results
4.1. Performance Measures
Our main measures of the return of each company are based on the rst and the last observed
valuation entry of the project (prior to exit). We rst calculate the internal rate of return (IRR) of
the project, by taking into account all intermediate investments.14 Then, we follow the standard
procedure and take logs of the IRR; the empirical frequency distribution of the resulting random
variable LOG IRR exhibits an approximately normal distribution.15
14The IRR is calculated as the rate r such that VT
(1+r)T
 Pt It(1+r)t   V0 = 0, where VT is the nal valuation, V0
the initial valuation; and It the investment amount in period 0 < t  T:
15Using logs is generally appropriate since raw returns are distributed asymetrically over the interval (-100%,1).
In the case of venture capital returns, this adjustment is indispensable since outliers with extreme IRRs close to
15
One problem with the IRR and LOG IRR measures is that they calculate each projectsreturn
in an isolated way, without adjusting for realized market returns. To take this into account, we
develop as a second return measure the excess return of the project compared with the reference
market. For Europe, we calculate the excess return as the di¤erence between the IRR and the
MSCI Europe Index return over the same period while for the US, we calculate the excess return
as the di¤erence between the IRR and the MSCI US Index return over the same period. For log
returns, we take logs of the MSCI returns and subtract them from LOG IRR to obtain the log
excess return (LOG EXC) as our principal dependent variable.
For many companies, we only have one valuation observation. As explained earlier, we drop
all observations where the unique valuation is in the rst nancing round. For those companies in
our sample for which we observe only a single valuation at a round later than the rst round, we
estimate a value V^1j for the rst stage valuation of company j as follows. For all the companies
for which a valuation at stage 1 was available, we calculate a multiple Qi = V1i=I1i expressing the
initial company value for company i as a multiple of the initial investment. We then calculate an
average ratio Qk for each of our seven industries k = 1; : : : ; 7; as the equal-weighted mean of all
the companies belonging to this particular industry. The observed Qk are actually slightly larger
in Europe, but we use uniform Qk across which introduces a bias against our results. We then
estimate the missing rst-stage valuation V^1j for a rm j located in industry k a the product
V^1j = QkI1j . To make sure that our results do not depend on this procedure, we redo our tests
described below by restricting the analysis to the subsample with complete valuation information,
which encompasses 61% of our full sample. We nd very similar results to those reported in our
tables and no di¤erence in signicance levels.
Summary statistics and comparisons between the Europe and the United States are given in
Table 3. Data are winsorized at the 1% level to reduce the impact of the extreme return values.
We observe that the mean and the median excess returns in the United States are 279% and
61:4%, respectively. Comparatively, they are only 62:5% and  25:2%, respectively, in Europe.
Both mean and median excess returns are signicantly lower in Europe (at the 0:01% level). The
same results hold when considering unadjusted returns, or returns measured in logs.16 It should
-100% or above +500% occur.
16The reason why the t-test is less signicant for the non-log rates of returns is the extremely high cross-sectional
variance of realized IRRs in venture nancing.
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also be added that 69% of European projects are below the median while only 39% of US projects
are below the median (not reported in the tables). We verify that our results do not depend on
winsorizing or the proportion of observations winsorized.
We use IRR as our leading performance measure but we need to consider its shortcomings. IRR
does not account for di¤erences in the investment horizon of projects or in the amount of funds
invested. In our view, these concerns are more important when VC is considered from an asset
pricing perspective but less relevant for our study that focuses on economic value created. Still, to
address them, we consider alternative performance measures. Following Gottschalg and Phalippou
(2007), we consider protability indices with a 10% and a 20% discount rate, respectively, that
should mitigate both drawbacks of the IRR. In addition, we alter our four IRR-based measures, by
weighting each observation by its initial as well as its total investment amount. In each case, we
nd that the results are entirely robust to the use of any of the alternative performance measures,
with virtually unchanged p-levels of signicance (results not reported).
Two interesting observations emerge. First, we obtain the same results when we calculate
returns separately for the UK and for all other European countries. This ensures that the low
performance of Europe, when compared with the US, is not driven by underperformance in a
single country, the UK, that is so dominant in the European sample. Second, it could be argued
that our results are sample biased since the number of rms having their nal valuation before
March 2000 is signicantly larger (at the 0:1% level) in the United States. This does not seem
to be the case, however, as the results are unchanged if we consider only rms that had their
last valuation after March 2000 (168 observations in the United States and 130 observations in
Europe).
Based on these observations, we consider the widest possible variety of reasons that are men-
tioned in the nance literature as drivers of venture capital performance. A rst possible expla-
nation is that US VCs are more skilled or more sophisticated, and are therefore able to ensure
a steeper value creation process, either by superior skills in the screening of business plans, or
because of more e¤ective contributions via monitoring and advising. For example, US VCs should,
on average, be more experienced because of the longer history of the industry in the US market. In
this respect, Kaplan, Martel and Stromberg (2007) and Lerner and Schoar (2004) document that
US VCs tend to apply the same contractual methods tested and used domestically when invest-
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ing abroad. For all these reasons, US VCs active in European projects should outperform their
European-grown peers. To test for this hypothesis, we split the European sample into projects
where at least one US-based venture capitalist was involved (hence contribute to the value creation
process) and those where only European investors were present in all nancing rounds. There
are 97 European projects in which a US VC was involved. The performances of rms from these
two sub-groups of European projects are not signicantly di¤erent at the 10% level (See Table 3,
Panel C). We also nd that the average Log Excess Return of European projects with US VC is
lower than the average Log Excess Return for of US projects at the 0:1% level (not reported in the
tables). To test further the possible impact of US VCs on the performance of European projects,
we sort out European projects in which more than 20% of the involved VCs are US VCs. There
are 59 such projects. Their average Log Excess Return is  0:3490. There are 88 other European
projects. Their average Log Excess Return is  0:3471. Again, the average performances in these
two subgroups are not statistically di¤erent at the 10% level. Hence, we do not nd any evidence
that the lower performance of US-based projects is due to the absence of the experience of US
venture capitalists,17 and the explanation for the performance gap must be sought elsewhere. In
our view, this nding does not contradict earlier evidence on the more sophisticated behavior of
US venture capital providers abroad compared to local funds. They could for example indicate
that distance and geographical proximity are important and hard to overcome as an e¤ective
barrier to the international expansion of venture capital development.
A second plausible explanation is whether the legal system in which a start-up company op-
erates has an impact on its performance (see, e.g., La Porta et al., 1997, 1998). While there are
various dimensions of di¤erences in legal systems that vary across Europe, we are unable to imple-
ment tests for di¤erences such as legality/absence of corruption and quality of law enforcement,
because our sample is heavily concentrated in North and Western European countries that exhibit
little variation along these dimensions. We can, however, test for the legal origin. To do so, we
split our European sample into companies from Common Law countries (UK and Ireland) and
companies from Civil Law origins (all other countries).18 Testing for di¤erence in performances,
17We also try di¤erent specications of the implication of US venture capitalists, such as measures of the fraction
or continuity of their involvement in European syndicates, with the same negative result.
18Due to the small number of observations we cannot split the Civil Law sample into French, German or Scan-
dinavian origin.
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we do not nd evidence that projects from Common Law countries obtain a higher return than
those from Civil Law countries (see Table 3, Panel D). Rather, we nd weak evidence of a smaller
median performance in Common Law countries. This suggests that legal origin can be ruled out
as a determinant of the performance gap.
Finally, the performance di¤erence could be owed to cross-country di¤erences in nancial
development (with stock market capitalization as the leading indicator) or to di¤erences in tax
treatments. We explore these avenues in the context of our regression analysis.
4.2. Multivariate Regression Analysis
Having highlighted di¤erences in performances between US and European projects, we perform
standard OLS regressions in order to nd out which characteristics inuence the performance
of a rm, and nd whether they provide a rationale for the di¤erence in performances observed
between the United States and Europe. First, we perform three types of regression for the entire
sample. The rst regression considers rm specic information and market conditions. The second
regression adds conditions about the rst nancing stage while the third regression considers rm
specic information, market conditions and contract variables that should be play a role during
the entire life cycle of the venture project. We also interact all these variables with the EU
DUMMY variable to see whether they have a di¤erent impact on performance in Europe and
in the United States. Then, we run the same types of regressions for European rms, excluding
the EU DUMMY variable and adding the US VC dummy variable. For all the regressions, the
dependent variable is LOG EXC, the logarithm of the excess return over the MSCI indices.
Results for the entire sample are provided in Table 4 that break down the measures of the
contracting relationship in two parts: Table 4a reports the regression for the variables that capture
the conditions in the rst nancing round, whereas Table 4b captures average conditions over the
entire nancing period. We observe that the EU DUMMY variable comes out highly signicant
at the 0:1% level in all regressions; it is the single most powerful variable in all the regression
specications that we ran.
Conversely, the COMMON LAW dummy variable does not come out signicantly. These
results conrm the ndings of the t-test analysis of returns in Table 3. we also use several country-
specic variables. Table 4a documents that neither the stock market development (1997 market
19
capitalization as a fraction of GDP) nor the EVCA tax and legal index19 show any measurable
impact. We reject therefore our hypotheses that stock market development or tax subsidies and
related conditions play a signicant role in explaining the European underperformance over the
sample period.
Concerning project size variables, we observe that the average project size (AVG AMOUNT)
has a signicant impact on performance. However, this impact is positive in the United States,
suggesting economies of scale, while it is negative in Europe. AMOUNT STAGE 1 is also sig-
nicantly negative at the 0:1% level. Since Europeans invest a signicantly larger fraction of
total investments in the rst round, this suggest that the power of making funding conditional on
milestones is weaker when more of the overall funds is provided up-front, and thus unconditionally.
Concerning contracting variables, an important nding is that the round duration variables,
either measured by the average round duration (AVG DURATION) or the rst round duration
(DURATION STAGE 1), have signicant impacts on performance of opposite sign in the United
States and in Europe. For the United States, the round-duration-performance relationship is as
theory predicts: shorter round imply more monitoring, hence better performance. The observed
positive relationship observed for Europe is puzzling. It might suggest that European VCs are
more reactive than proactive; in other words, European VCs tend to shorten funding intervals
only when things turn wrong.
We nd almost no impact for our measure of the continuity of funding relationships. If
anything, there seems to be a slight advantage for specialization over ongoing relationships.
Results for the European sample are provided in Table 5. Results are identical to those of
Table 4 concerning contract and market condition variables: the average round duration and the
rst round duration have an signicant positive impact of the performance. Furthermore, the
US VC dummy and the COMMON LAW dummy do not come out signicantly, conrming the
results of Table 3.
Overall, we nd evidence that contracting-related variables matter. They tend to come out
19The EVCA index is an aggregate score for 2003 (the rst year for which it is available) with the best score of 1.2
for Great Britain and the lowest score of 2.53 for Austria in our sample. Taking the EVCA criteria, we determine
a score of 1.4 for the United States by our own calculations. The US obtains a score slightly lower than Britain
(but higher than all other countries in Europe) notably because of relatively high corporate tax rates and lengthy
bankruptcy procedures.
The EVCA score is an aggregate score over 13 measures of scal and legal conditions; we obtain similar results
when we use only the score for tax subsidies towards venture investments.
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with the sign predicted by theory in the United States, but with the wrong sign in Europe. These
explanatory variables, however, cannot fully explain the di¤erences in VC performance since the
coe¢ cient for the EU Dummy remains economically signicant.
5. Exit Choices and Venture Capital Performance
The literature has long held that exit conditions are a key performance driver in venture nancing,
and the absence of an active IPO market for venture-backed companies has been viewed as the
perhaps single most important reason for the late and timid development of venture nancing
in Europe (Black and Gilson, 1998). Moreover, there is ample evidence that the exit choices
of venture-backed start-ups follow a clear performance hierarchy, with top-performing companies
choosing IPOs, companies opting for trade sales on average performing less well, whereas troubled
investments would see delayed exits or write-o¤s. Our objective in this section is to explore
whether we nd evidence for di¤erences in exit performance or in the hierarchy of exit routes that
could help to explain the transatlantic performance gap.
This question is particularly interesting for our sample period because, as argued in Section 2.,
a characteristic element from 1997 to 2003 is that new stock markets had opened across Europe
modeled after the NASDAQ example that were geared up to high-tech start-ups, and that were
successful almost instantly, in terms of the number of IPOs they could attract. Our hypothesis
is, therefore, that the Black and Gilson argument of the role of a lacking IPO market, while
historically true, was no longer applicable to this period. Conversely, if we nd di¤erences in the
performance of venture-backed companies going public between the US and Europe, this might
indicate that the existence of dedicated stock markets is not su¢ cient to create exit conditions
conducive to venture nancing.
To investigate these issues, we extend our observation horizon to include the exit stage, and we
explore whether we nd signicant di¤erences in the relative performance of the subsamples having
opted for di¤erent exit options. Specically, we construct samples of venture-backed companies
in the US and in Europe having exited via an IPO or via a trade sale. We then seek to obtain
data on exit valuations for these companies, and we calculate a new IRR for the complete venture
capital cycle from the rst investment round to exit that we call the full venture cycle IRR, as
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opposed to the IRRs used so far that stopped at the last reported nancing round.
Within our US sample of 233 randomly selected companies after 1997 described in Section 3.,
we are able to identify 32 companies that exited via an IPO (13.7% of the US sample) and 52
trade sales (22.2%) that occur between 1997 and early 2005 from Venture Economics. We nd
exit valuations for 29 of the IPOs (12.4% of the US sample) and 32 of the trade sales (13.7%),
which together form our US exit sample.20 In Europe, we encounter the di¢ culty that the number
of companies having exited through an IPO or a trade sale within our sample of 146 companies
with su¢ cient valuation information is too small for a statistical evaluation.21 To overcome this
problem, we go back to our base sample of European venture-backed companies obtained from
Venture Economics with rst rounds in the 1997-2003 period, and after applying the same lters
as before we initially select all companies that are reported as exited through IPO or acquisition.
Most of these companies had to be excluded previously because there was insu¢ cient valuation
information to determine an IRR based on round valuations. We then seek to obtain data on exit
valuations for this sample, which yields a sample of 54 IPOs and 19 trade sales in Europe for
which we can estimate the IRRs over their full venture cycle.22
Table 6 contains the ndings for the IPO and the trade sale sample. We ignore observations
with a very short complete venture cycle (less than three months for IPOs and four months for
trade sales) since they contain a disproportionate number of extreme outliers, and also because
performance will reect market conditions more than fundamentals if venture capitalists have such
a short time to add value. The summary statistics show that, consistent with previous literature,
companies that exit through IPOs exhibit a very high performance on average, with an annual IRR
20The US exit valuations were all found in Venture Economics.
21 In the sample of 146 European observations, we can identify only 8 IPOs with observable exit valuations, even
though we search through a variety of additional data sources such as national stock markets and equity issues
reported in Dealogic. We believe that there are two reasons for this scarcity of exit observations: rst, the slump
in the liquidity conditions on the exit markets after 2001 was more severe and more protracted in Europe than in
the US. Second, a majority of the companies in the European sample start relatively late in the sample period, and
many of them were not ready for exit before liquidity conditions on the exit markets worsened. We cannot exclude,
however, a selection bias in the Venture Economics data base that relies on voluntary reporting.
22We searched Venture Economics but also a variety of other sources, including the Dealogic database on equity
issuance, Lexis-Nexis and Factiva, national stock exchanges, and nally in a few cases communications from re-
searchers monitoring IPO activity in Europe. We thank in particular Peter Roosenboom and Wolfgang Aussenegg
for their help.
Our resampling strategy is so successful because a large number of European companies with successful exits had
to be excluded earlier as we could not calculate an intermediate IRR, but we can now determine the IRR over the
full venture cycle by adding the observation of their exit valuations. The ensuing exit sample is derived from the
same Venture Economics base sample employed before and shows no systematic di¤erence to the earlier sample.
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of 1,001% (median 160.7%), and almost identical numbers for excess return relative to regional
MSCI segment (mean 988.4%, median 150.4%). Companies exiting through acquisitions show a
performance that is markedly lower, with a mean IRR of 93.3% (median -8.8%). When looking
at excess returns, with a mean of 96.9% (median 0.6%), returns are slightly higher, implying
that trade sales are particularly a¤ected by adverse market timing e¤ects, that is, exits taking
place under adverse market conditions. While there is considerable uncertainty because of small
samples and an important in-sample variance, the means appear still high when compared with
the average performance reported above in Section 4.. Thus, our ndings appear to lend support
to the concept of a performance hierarchy according to the exit path.23
Is this hierarchy a possible explanation for the strong performance gap between the US and
Europe that we nd? When we look at possible return di¤erences in the top segment of companies
exiting through IPOs, the answer seems to be negative. We nd a mean IRR of 404% (median
162%) in the US and a mean IRR of 1,370 % (median 159%) in Europe, and very similar numbers
when we look at excess returns relative to the respective MSCI segments. So while the mean IPO
returns are actually higher in Europe than in the US, and the medians indistinguishable (slightly
higher in the US for absolute returns and higher in Europe for excess returns), none of these
di¤erences is statistically signicant as we report in Table 6.
A di¤erent picture emerges when we look at trade sales. Here, the Europeans underperform,
with a mean IRR of -12.4% (median -30.4%). Adverse market conditions can only account for
a fraction of this poor performance, since excess returns are still substantially negative with a
mean of -7.7% (median -20.4%). By contrast, in the US acquisitions are positive, with a mean
IRR of 156% (median -2.6%) that, when stripping out the contemporaneous MSCI market returns,
become unambiguously positive with a mean of 159% (median of 6.7%). Our t-tests show that the
di¤erence in means is signicant at the 5% level, but there is only a weakly signicant di¤erence
in medians.
Overall, we nd that companies with an IPO exit perform similarly in the US and in Europe,
whereas trade sales show some evidence of a performance di¤erence. For the residual and (in our
sample) largest segment, we cannot make any direct comparison since performance is of course
23A necessary caveat, however, is that we compare IRRs over the full venture cycle to IRRs that stop at an
intermediate funding period.
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unobservable. This segment encompasses the wide spectrum of companies that are written o¤,
that do never exit or exit by other means, such as buybacks or nancial acquisitions. But it seems
possible to conclude that the observed di¤erence on the trade sale subsample appears insu¢ cient
to explain the performance gap that we document for the full sample, based on the following
simple calculation: a performance di¤erence in median excess returns of 9.4% (168% in means)
in this segment cannot account for a di¤erence of 84% in median excess returns in the full sample
(483% in means; see Table 2 for the comparison), given that there is no di¤erence in the IPO
segment.24 Thus, it is highly probable that in the bottom segment for which we cannot observe
performance, European venture capital strongly underperforms its US counterpart. On the whole,
our ndings appear consistent with the notion that the underperformance in Europe is explained
by much lower returns for poorly performing companies.
An important caveat is that we have no means to verify whether the three main exit routes
(IPOs, trade sales, and others) occur in roughly comparable frequencies in Europe and in the
United States. It is possible that European venture capital underperforms not because in any of
the three performance segments companies do less well than their US counterparts, but because
top and medium performers are signicant less frequent than in the USA. In either case, we
conclude that the performance di¤erence is likely to occur at the bottom of the hierarchy. However,
we cannot say whether this is due to a less discriminating project selection or whether monitoring
and stopping decisions of troubled venture projects are less successful.
6. Robustness and Endogeneity Concerns
6.1. Sample Selection Bias
Selection bias is an important concern in any empirical study on venture capital performance, and
various authors have considered the problem as nearly inevitable in a database such as Venture
Economics where all reporting is voluntary, and where reports are incomplete; even in the US
database many valuations are unreported. As Woodward and Hall (2003) put it, the companies
that do report valuations are not a random sample, they are a biased sample. Good news is
24While this comparison mixes di¤erent IRR concepts, a possible bias would work against our argument since
di¤erences in IRRs across segments should grow as we expand the horizon.
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reported more often than bad(p. 4). Kaplan and Schoar (2005) and Cochrane (2005) express a
similar conviction that selection bias would create an upwards bias on returns.
The sample selection problem can be decomposed into two parts. First, the self-selection bias
arising from the voluntary nature of reports. This bias cannot be corrected since no control sample
without such a bias exists. Second, the bias for exited projects that arises if performance metrics
are based only on companies with a successful exit and a reported exit valuation. Exit samples are
generally a biased sample, as the performance hierarchy discussed in Section 5. implies. Cochrane
(2005) and Woodward and Hall (2003) present proposals to remedy for the bias for exited projects
by applying Heckman corrections, based on imputed sample means that they obtain by using the
best available (but still incomplete) reporting on the nal exit routes of portfolio companies. Their
methods cannot fully correct for sample selection bias, however, and we cannot replicate their
procedures for lack of exit observations in the European sample.
Our return measure that spans only up to the last nancing round and does not include the
exit stage should be less exposed to the bias for exited projects for the following reason: poor
performers that are written o¤ or that have no recorded exit will not be included in a sample
where performance is determined until exit, but they should be included in our sample (unless
there was only a single nancing round). While we do not want to put too much weight on this
argument it is, in our view, an important theoretical advantage of our return measure.
We certainly concede that a self-selection bias produced by voluntarily reported valuations
remains. Our primary argument with respect to this bias is that any bias present in our sample
should work against our main result of a performance gap between the US and Europe. Since
voluntary reporting to Venture Economics is much less complete in Europe than in the US, it
should be easier for European funds than for US funds to report selectively (presumably there
is less peer pressure to disclose transactions). As noted, voluntary selective reporting should
typically translate into an upward bias. Thus, the upwards bias should be worse in Europe than
in the US. Also, European deal reporting should be subject to less scrutiny from comparisons
with other reporting sources, such as limited partners.
Finally, the aggregate return numbers for Europe imply very poor realized returns over the
sample period, in absolute terms and relative to a variety of performance benchmarks, that make
any large-scale upwards bias in returns unlikely.
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6.2. Endogeneity Problems
An important concern is the possible endogeneity of the contracting-related variables in our re-
gressions. For example, it could be argued that a highly signicant variable such as AVG DURA-
TION is determined by unobservable characteristics that inuence both company performance
and contracting choices since the contracting parties knew from the outset.
Reverse Causality. To a large extent, we should be able to address this concern by testing
for the presence of reverse causality. Namely, if contracting choices are driven by unobserved
characteristics that also determine performance, then regressing performance in early nancing
rounds on contracting conditions in subsequent rounds should show a signicant relationship, as-
suming that returns are persistent over the sample horizon. The staged nature of venture funding
provides a good opportunity to check for reverse causality, since the observation period in many
cases encompasses more than two valuation observations so that we can construct dependent
and independent variables over successive time periods. We proceed as follows. For all rms
for which we have at least three valuations (119 US rms and 22 European rms), we compute
an internal rate of return for nancing round between the rst and the second valuation (IRR1)
and an internal rate of return for nancing rounds between the second and the last valuation
(IRR2). From these two internal rates of returns, we construct LOG EXC1 and LOG EXC2 and
we also construct lifetime-information variables for the two periods in the same way as described
in Section 4.1.. Running OLS regressions with LOG EXC1 as the explained variable and lifetime-
information variables as explanatory variable for the full sample, we do not nd any evidence
of reverse causality: the coe¢ cient for the AVG DURATION variable for the second period is
insignicant, and the same is true for other contracting-related variables reported in Table 4. The
only exception is subsequent funding, since we do nd a weakly signicant positive relationship
between performance in the rst period and AVG AMOUNT in the second period. This relation-
ship, however, is expected and expresses only that VCs are reactive to good performance early
on. Interestingly, we nd such a reactive relationship only in the US, not in Europe.
Instrumental Variables Tests. Another standard method that we apply is to dene instru-
mental variables for the variables possibly a¤ected by endogeneity problems. For each of the
contracting-related variables AVG AMOUNT, AVG SYNDICATE SIZE and AVG DURATION,
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as well as for the corresponding variables covering the rst round (AMOUNT STAGE 1, SYNDI-
CATE SIZE STAGE 1, and DURATION STAGE 1, we dene as instruments the average values
that we nd for these variables over the entire US sample contained in Venture Economics. We
then t these instruments successively in an instrumental variables regression with the appropriate
error correction. We nd that the variables AVG DURATION, AVG AMOUNT and DURATION
STAGE 1 remain signicant in the full sample, but not in the European sample. Thus, overall our
instrumental variables regressions seem to conrm that our results are not fundamentally driven
by endogeneity.
6.3. Return Benchmark
We veried that our results on the performance gap are not driven by the choice of the respective
benchmark indices, the MSCI US and MSCI Europe, respectively. While these are arguably the
best available international equity market benchmarks, they report the returns on mature public
equity markets whereas venture investments concern highly illiquid stakes in small technology
rms. A better suited benchmark would be the segment of public equity markets that is closest
to the sample of rm under consideration, i.e. a market index for small technology rms. The
di¢ culty is that a convincing benchmark for European technology rms, even on a country level,
is not available. We therefore benchmarked both the US and the European sample against the
NASDAQ Composite index, and recalculated the LOG EXC variable. The ndings are almost
unchanged, both in the univariate comparison of the performance gap as in the regression analy-
sis. In fact, as inspection of Table 3 shows, the impact of the benchmarking index is negligible
compared to the level and risk in the LOG IRR variable.
7. Conclusion
Until very recently, research on venture capital has exclusively focused on the United States, and
quite naturally so since this industry was hardly existent in other parts of the world. The bull
market for high-tech rms in the late 1990s has created markets for venture capital elsewhere. This
paper presents a comparative study of the performance of the VC industry in Europe and in the
United States over the 1997-2003 period. Performance is measured by the internal rate of return
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of each VC-backed company between the rst and the last nancing round. Unlike earlier studies
that have either calculated returns up to the exit stage, or used aggregate fund level performance
that again includes only exited projects, this measure for VC performance systematically including
projects that are write-o¤s or have no recorded exit. Moreover, the remaining (and important)
sample selection bias that we cannot address should actually magnify the e¤ect of our main result.
We show that the US venture capital industry strongly outperform their European peers.
When trying to identify determinants of this performance gap, we nd that contracting-related
determinants play a crucial role: 1) US venture capitalists show a positive relationship between
total funding and performance while the reverse is true for Europeans. One reason appears to
be that US VCs react with an increased funding ow upon good early performance, in contrast
to Europeans; 2) US VCs use instruments of control and contingent funding e¢ ciently, since
performance reacts positively to shorter funding intervals in the US, while the opposite is true in
Europe; 3) US-based venture investors use syndication more e¤ectively, as their syndicates grow
over time, while their European counterparts do not (but our results are only weakly signicant
on this last point). Moreover, US VCs include more specialized VCs and more corporate investors.
Overall, there is evidence that US venture capitalists are more sophisticated than their European
counterparts (in the sense that their behavior is more aligned with theoretical predictions) and
that this contributes to the explanation of the di¤erence in performance.
We also investigate possible reverse causality and dene instruments to address endogeneity
problems; these tests show that our results are unlikely to be driven by endogeneity.
When looking at other potential determinants of the performance gap we nd no evidence
that the performance gap can be attributed to the di¤erence in legal origin between Common Law
and Civil Law countries, to stock market capitalization, or to the tax environment for venture
nancing. Surprisingly, we do not nd evidence that European companies that include US-based
venture funds among their nanciers perform any better than companies that rely exclusively
on European homegrown funds. Thus, it seems that the larger expertise and more sophisticated
approach to contracting of US VCs that is documented in a number of earlier and contemporaneous
studies is not easily leveraged into other markets or successfully exported abroad. Disentangling
the origins of this di¢ culty further is an important question for future research.
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Appendix
Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Median Min. Max.
TMT (dummy) 379 0.483 0.500 0 0 1
Corporate Investor (dummy) 376 0.293 0.456 0 0 1
Age (years) 319 2.145 3.181 1.071 0 22
Total Duration (years) 379 1.807 1.041 1.666 0.25 5.306
Total Stages 379 3.398 1.424 3 2 11
Avg Duration (years) 379 0.851 0.485 0.737 0.065 3.145
Avg Syndicate Size 379 3.336 1.914 3 1 13.33
Avg Amount ($ Mill.) 377 10.776 11.345 7.45 0.018 83.66
Avg Continuity 379 0.235 0.186 0.203 0 0.8
Early Continuity (dummy) 379 0.402 0.375 0.333 0 1
Duration Stage 1(years) 379 0.822 0.548 0.668 0.06 3.145
Syndicate Size Stage 1 379 2.493 1.721 2 1 18
Amount Stage 1 ($ Mill.) 377 5.706 7.914 3.0 0 79.57
- relative to avg round investment 377 0.700 0.632 0.523 0 3.571
- as % of initial rm value 231 38.02 21.35 35.46 0.017 100
Bubble start 379 0.485 0.500 0 0 1
Bubble end 379 0.169 0.375 0 0 1
Table 1: Sample Characteristics. This table records sample means and related statistics for the com-
bined sample of US and European venture-backed companies. The table includes all companies in the sample with
a rst nancing round in 1996 or later, if the companies were seed or early stage in at least one round, and had at
least one successive valuation recorded. Age is the di¤erence between the rst recorded nancing round and the
companys founding date. Total Duration is the time elapsed between the rst nancing round and the last round
for which a valuation is recorded. Total Stages is the total number of nancing rounds, and Average Duration
is Total Duration / Total Stages. Total Investors reports the number of investors participating in at least one
nancing round. Total Investment Amount is the combined sum of nancing in all rounds. Amount per Investor
is Total Investment amount / Total Number of Investors. Funds Present in All Stages (Dummy) is equal to one
if at least one investor provided funds in all rounds, and zero otherwise. Funds Present in All Stages (Number) is
the number of investors that provided funds in all rounds. Average continuity is the average percentage of prevous
investors providing funds in the next stage. Early continuity is a dummy that is equal to one if at least one investor
participated in the rst and second round. Initial duratin is the duratin of the rst stage. Number Investors
First Round the number participating in the rst round. Initial Q is the ratio of valuation and investment in the
rst round, provided both numbers are reported. Started prior to 1998 is a dummy equal to one if the rst stage
commenced prior to September 1998. Final Value 1998 - March 2000 is a dummy equal to one if the last stage
with a round valuation falls onto these 19 months commonly associated with the internet bubble. Sector TMT is
a dummy equal to one if the company falls into internet or telecommunications, media.
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Mean Europe Mean USA Di¤erence P -value
TMT 0.486 0.480 0.489 0.916
Corporate Investor (dummy) 0.181 0.361 -0.178 0.001
Age (years) 2.455 1.965 0.006 0.187
Total Duration (years) 1.878 1.692 0.186 0.0893
Total stages 3.328 3.442 0.114 0.4518
Avg Duration (years) 0.860 0.844 0.16 0.753
Avg Syndicate Size 2.828 3.656 -0.828 0.000
Total Investment Amount ($ Mill.) 27.332 49.218 -21.882 0.000
Avg Amount ($ Mill.) 7.688 12.684 -4.99 0.000
Avg Continuity 0.269 0.212 0.057 0.003
Early Continuity (Dummy) 0.444 0.376 0.068 0.086
Duration Stage 1 (years) 0.844 0.809 0.035 0.542
Syndicate Size Stage 1 2.369 2.570 -0.201 0.269
Amount Stage 1 ($ Mill.) 5.45 5.86 -0.41 0.682
- relative to avg round investment 0.870 0.595 0.275 0.000
- as % of initial rm value 18.7 15.6 3.16 0.844
Bubble Start 0.445 0.510 -0.065 0.215
Bubble End 0.055 0.240 -0.185 0.000
Number of Observations 146 233
Table 2: Tests for Di¤erences in Means for Sample Characteristics. This table tests for
di¤erences in sample means between US and European venture-backed companies. The table includes all companies
in the sample with a rst nancing round in 1996 or later, if the companies were seed or early stage in at least one
round, and had at least one successive valuation recorded. All variables are as dened in Table 1. The number of
observations is as recorded in the last row, except for Funds in All Stages (2 ob. missing), Age (62 obs. missing),
and Initial Q (149 obs. missing). Two-sided t-test for di¤erence in mean (equal variance in both samples), H0:
Di¤erence is equal to zero. Levels of signicance: =10%, =5%, =1%, =0.1%.
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Panel A: Full Sample
Number of Obs. Mean Std.Deviation Median Min. Max.
IRR 379 1.958 5.850 0.2139 -0.9920 35.670
Excess Return 379 1.964 5.810 0.2777 -0.9644 35.541
Log IRR 379 0.1595 1.445 0.1939 -4.8364 3.602
Log Excess Return 379 0.1940 1.452 0.2624 -4.8364 4.937
Panel B: Europe and USA
Europe US Tests
Number of Obs. 146 233 Di¤. in means Di¤. in medians
Mean Median Mean Median P -value P -value
IRR 0.625 -0.2519 2.7936 0.6137 0.000 0.000
Excess Return 0.665 -0.2075 2.7776 0.6242 0.000 0.000
Log IRR -0.601 -0.2903 0.6360 0.4785 0.000 0.000
Log Excess Return -0.544 -0.3099 0.6565 0.4723 0.000 0.000
Panel C: Europe
with US VC without US VC Tests
Number of Obs. 96 50 Di¤. in means Di¤. in medians
Mean Median Mean Median P -value P -value
IRR 0.5940 -0.1894 0.6832 -0.3941 0.45 0.38
Excess Return 0.6250 -0.1381 -0.6008 -0.4083 0.44 0.38
Log IRR -0.4892 -0.2103 -0.8151 -0.5011 0.86 0.38
Log Excess Return -0.4359 -0.1565 -0.7521 0.4908 0.86 0.38
Panel D: Europe
Common Law Countries Civil Law Countries Tests
Number of Obs. 74 72 Di¤. in means Di¤. in medians
Mean Median Mean Median P -value P -value
IRR 0.4350 -0.4523 1.7069 -0.1272 0.29 0.069
Excess Return 0.4828 -0.3984 1.7380 -0.1361 0.30 0.136
Log IRR -1.2708 -0.6026 -0.3355 -0.1361 0.027 0.069
Log Excess Return -1.211 -0.5461 -0.2934 -0.1145 0.027 0.247
Table 3: Summary Statistics for Returns. This table records sample means, medians and related
statistics for the full sample (Panel A) of 233 US and 146 European companies. The table includes all companies
that obtained a rst nancing round in 1997 or later, are genuine venture-backed companies (seed or early stage
funding in at least one round or less than 3 years old), and had at least one successive valuation recorded. Data
are winsorized at the 1Panel B reports means and medians for the subsamples in Europe and the US. The tests
are two-sided t-tests for di¤erences in sample means (unequal variances according to Satterthwaites method) and
a Wilcoxon signed rank test for medians. H0: Di¤erence is equal to zero. IRR: internal rate of returns, between
rst valution date 0 and last valuation date T , calculated as rate r such that VT
(1+r)T
 Pt It(1+r)t  V0 = 0, where
VT is the nal valuation, V0 the initial valuation; and It the investment amount in period 0 < t  T:Log IRR:
IRR in logs. Excess Return (Log Excess Return): IRR - annualized return on MSCI over the same period (in logs).
Panels C compares fo the European subsample the IRRs for companies with or without at least one US-based VC
rm participating in at least one round. Panel C distinguishes between common law countries (UK and Ireland)
and other countries in the European subsample. Levels of signicance: =10%, =5%, =1%, =0.1%.
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Full sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
EU Dummy -1.0718 -1.2038 -1.193 -1.2057 -1.201
(-7.76) (-5.26) (-2.80) (-2.94) (-2.87)
Common Law -0.0933 -0.0195
(-0.39) (-0.08)
Market Cap./GDP -0.0746
(-0.34)
Tax and Legal Score (EVCA) 0.0484
(0.19)
Bubble Start 0.341 0.279 0.276 0.276
(2.63) (2.14) (2.12) (2.12)
Bubble StartEU Dummy 0.381 0.212 0.196 0.197
(1.40) (0.82) (0.75) (0.75)
TMT 0.2444 0.215 0.212 0.212
(1.85) (1.65) (1.65) (1.65)
TMTEU Dummy -0.140 0.097 0.104 0.107
(-0.52) (0.40) (0.39) (0.40)
Early Cont. -0.133 -0.133 -0.133
(-0.70) (-0.67) (-0.67)
Early ContEU Dummy -0.121 -0.104 -0.110
(-0.34) (-0.30) (-0.31)
Amount Stage 1 -0.366 -0.3662 -0.3661
(-3.14) (-3.14) (-3.14)
Amount Stage 1EU Dummy -0.187 -0.185 -0.187
(-0.99) (-0.97) (-0.98)
Syndicate Size Stage 1 -0.122 -0.122 -0.122
(-0.44) (-0.44) (-0.44)
Syndicate Size Stage 1EU Dummy -0.0242 -0.0263 -0.0263
(-0.33) (-0.36) (-0.35)
Duration Stage 1 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0006
(-2.09) (-2.09) (-2.09)
Duration Stage 1EU Dummy 0.0013 0.0013 0.0013
(2.94) (2.92) (2.95)
Constant 0.6007 0.4049 0.8674 0.9392 0.7801
(9.09) (1.59) (2.82) (2.92) (1.99)
R2 0.1619 0.2141 0.2917 0.2920 0.2918
F 15.93 13.31 9.48 9.45 9.46
Observations 371 371 369 369 369
Table 4a: Impact of Contracting Conditions in the Initial Round. OLS Regression (Log
Excess Return as Dependent Variable). Robust regressions for the full sample of US and European
companies with rst nancing round in 1997 or later, genuine venture capital (seed or early stage funding in at least
one round or less than 3 years old), and at least one successive reported valuation. EU Dummy = 1 if company
based in the EU-15 countries, and EU Dummy = 0 for US-based companies. Common Law = 1 if the country has a
Common Law system (US, UK, and Ireland) and equal to 0 otherwise (all other countries). Stock Market Cap./GDP
is the 1997 ratio of aggregate stock market capitalization to GDP. EVCA tax and legal score is an index documented
in EVCA (2003) and comprised between 1 (favorable) and 3 (unfavorable); the US score is based on the authors
calculations. All other variables are explained in Table 1. Sample is winsorized at 1%. Heteroskedasticity-consistent
(White) t-statistics in brackets. Levels of signicance: =10%, =5%, =1%, =0.1%.
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Full sample
(3)
EU Dummy -1.955
(-3.91)
Common Law 0.126
(0.49)
Bubble Start 0.221
(1.75)
Bubble StartEU Dummy 0.549
(2.11)
TMT 0.1609
(1.26)
TMTEU Dummy 0.1613
(0.61)
Corp. Investor 0.0632
(0.43)
Corp. InvestorEU Dummy 0.756
(2.99)
Avg. Continuity -0.673
(-1.78)
Avg. ContinuityEU Dummy -0.146
(-0.22)
Avg. Amount 0.0187
(3.04)
Avg. AmountEU Dummy -0.045
(-2.32)
Avg. Duration -0.450
(-3.12)
Avg. DurationEU dummy 0.736
(3.42)
Avg. Syndicate Size -0.0358
(-0.95)
Avg. Syndicate SizeEU Dummy 0.139
(1.69)
Constant 0.684
(1.88)
R2 0.3119
F 7.08
Observations 366
Table 4b: Impact of Contracting Conditions over All Rounds. OLS Regression with
Log Excess Return as Dependent Variable. Robust regressions for the full sample of US and European
companieswith a rst nancing round in 1997 or later and that are genuine venture-backed companies (seed or early
stage funding in at least one round or less than 3 years old), and had at least one successive valuation recorded.
EU Dummy = 1 if the company is based in one of the EU-15 countries, and EU Dummy = 0 if the company is
in the US. All other variables are explained in Table 1 and Table 4a. The sample is winsorized by eliminating 1%
of outliers. Heteroskedasticity-consistent (White) t-statistics in brackets. Levels of signicance: =10%, =5%,
=1%, =0.1%.
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Europe
(1) (2) (3)
Common Law -0.3025 -0.1991 -0.0679
(-1.15) (-0.77) (-0.24)
US VC -0.0018 -0.0242 0.0683
(-0.06) (-0.08) (0.23)
Bubble Start 0.4553 0.170 0.4432
(1.41) (0.51) (1.27)
TMT 0.324 0.528 0.5325
(1.13) (1.89) (1.87)
Corp. Investor 0.9152
(4.03)
Early Cont. -0.348
(-1.01)
Amount Stage 1 -0.718
(-3.60)
Syndicate Size Stage 1 -0.1329
(-1.05)
Duration Stage 1 0.0007
(1.66)
Avg. Continuity -1.179
(-1.41)
Avg. Amount -0.0172
(-0.87)
Avg. Duration 0.3942
(1.96)
Avg. Syndicate Size 0.0228
(0.22)
Constant -0.761 0.1388 -1.1184
(-3.14) (0.30) (-2.37)
R2 0.0475 0.1803 0.1811
F 0.088 5.97 5.12
Observations 143 141 138
Table 5: OLS regression with log Excess Return as dependent variable. Robust regressions for
European companies started in 1997 or later and are genuine venture-backed companies (seed or early stage funding
in at least one round or less than 3 years old), and had at least one successive valuation recorded. All variables
are explained in Table 1. The sample is winsorized by eliminating 1% of outliers. Heteroskedasticity-consistent
(White) t-statistics in brackets. Levels of signicance: =10%, =5%, =1%, =0.1%.
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Panel A: Full Sample
IPOs Trade Sales
Number of obs. 76 51
mean median mean median
IRR 10.012 1.6072 0.9328 -0.0882
Excess Return 9.884 1.5169 0.9692 0.0056
Log IRR 0.9206 0.9583 -0.0292 -0.0924
Log Excess Return 0.8095 0.8289 0.0146 0.0059
Panel B: IPOs
Europe United States Tests
Number of obs. 47 29 Di¤. in means Di¤. in medians
mean median mean median P -value P -value
IRR 13.692 1.5906 4.047 1.6261 0.195 0.813
Excess Return 13.565 1.5169 3.917 1.472 0.195 0.479
Log IRR 0.8873 0.9519 0.9743 0.9655 0.206 0.813
Log Excess Return 0.7798 0.8351 0.8576 0.823 0.187 0.813
Panel C: Trade Sales
Europe United States Tests
Number of obs. 19 32 Di¤. in means Di¤. in medians
mean median mean median P -value P -value
IRR -0.1241 -0.3041 1.560 -0.026 0.03 0.055
Excess Return -0.077 -0.027 1.590 0.067 0.029 0.18
Log IRR -0.4931 -0.3626 0.2463 -0.0265 0.021 0.055
Log Excess Return -0.4361 -0.238 0.282 0.068 0.020 0.18
Table 6: Performance until Exit and Exit Hierarchy. Observations are observed exits in the
Venture Economics sample of 233 randomly US companies and all observed exits of European companies in Venture
Economics with exit valuations, respectively. Companies had a rst valuation stage after 1997, at least one stage
labeled as seed or early stage or were not more than 3 years old at the rst round. We excluded observations with
a total duration from rst round to exit of less than 3 months (IPOs) or less than 4 months (trade sales). The tests
are two-sided t-tests for di¤erences in sample means (unequal variances according to Satterthwaites method) and
a Wilcoxon signed rank test for medians. t-statistics in brackets. Levels of signicance: =10%, =5%, =1%,
=0.1%.
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